The Palestinian Authority’s (PA) claim to embody the spirit of the “ArabSpring”, through its recent “state-building” agenda – including its elevation to “non-member observer status” at the United Nations – is disingenuous.This conclusion rests on three key arguments outlined in this article. First, this article identiﬁes a continuation of broader patterns of authoritarianism represented by the PA’s lack of adherence to democratic practices, the deprivation of access for the Palestinian population to basic resources and the wider issue of the continued absence of Palestinian sovereignty. Second, it identiﬁes the intensiﬁcation of some authoritarian practices withinPalestine, particularly in the areas of security and policing, for example by the use of force against protestors. Finally, this article identiﬁes that civil-society groups and opposition supporters throughout 2011–2012 have more genuinely embodied evidence of resistance to authoritarianism in popular demonstrations against the PA
This article aims to understand the UK government’s varied responses to the Arab Spring. The UK was criticised for its inconsistent and/or selective responses to popular uprisings in the Arab world. These ranged from providing substantial military support for the rebels in Libya to offering notably muted reactions to government suppression of protests in Bahrain. On assuming office, the Foreign secretary, William Hague, suggested that Britain would have a networked approach to foreign policy with a greater awareness of the bilateral interests that Britain had with other countries around the world. What this article aims to do is offer a provisional analysis of the security, economic and societal networks that the UK holds with states in the Arab world and in doing so to test whether these have any correlation with the British government’s policy towards protests in the region.
Drawing on extensive fieldwork during the Israeli construction of the Wall in Palestine, we challenge the way in which state-centric—and implicitly hierarchical—discourses around the concept of security (a) underlie the real-world manifestations of restrictive apparatus and practises; and (b) effectively justify discriminate use of these practices along ethno-nationalistic lines. We argue that an alternative approach to security in this context is possible. We highlight how, “desecuritization”—a key tool advocated by the Copenhagen School of Critical Security Studies—may indeed bring back quotidian power negotiations to individuals and empower them, but in this and other contexts, much more is needed. We follow from the normative agenda articulated in the Aberystwyth School’s literature, toward “emancipation.” Namely, by challenging the basic assumptions central to a dominant—exclusivist— interpretation of security, it is possible to conceive of radically different alternatives to the status quo.
OVERVIEW OF THE BENEFITS OF FIRST NATIONS LANGUAGE IMMERSION, WISE PRACTICES FOR INDIGENOUS LANGUAGE IMMERSION, AND PROVISIONS FOR SUPPORTING IMMERSION EDUCATION IN THE FIRST NATIONS CONTROL OF FIRST NATIONS EDUCATION ACT
In the wake of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada report into the ‘cultural genocide’ perpetrated by the State of Canada against First Nations, Métis and Inuit peoples, through the widespread use of Residential Schools, the federal government offered an apology and an apparent opportunity for reconciliation . Part of this programme was new legislation that would govern the relationship between First Nations and the federal government over First Nations education. Entitled the First Nations Control of First Nations’ Education (FNCFNE), the proposed bill promised a new deal and an apparent chance to renew a tarnished relationship. Yet in spite of its name, the bill offered very little in terms of progress. Indeed if it had been implemented, in many cases, the bill would have done little to increase First Nations’ control over the education of First Nations’ children and likely would have made effective language education extremely difficult. Indeed, this article’s analysis of the bill shows that, at its core, the law represents little more than the reinforcing of existing settler-colonial power dynamics. In particular, while it would have shifted virtually the totality of administrative responsibility for on-reserve education to First Nations it would have reserved ultimate power – manifest through control over funding – to Ottawa. As a result the FNCFNE would have represented a profound step in undermining First Nations language rights and language education in Canada.